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knowledge or self-determination of the First; and this the denial of independent being, and of any being whatsoever. Again, if we apply the principle of creation—self-knowing of the Absolute is creating—we may say that a world of imperfect beings implies the self-recognition of passivity or derivation on the part of the Creator. If there were actual present passivity and derivation, He could not be a Creator by reason of imperfection which would appear as a separation of Will from Intellect, as in Man. But His logical precondition of derivation and passivity would imply a First Person. Again, these two would imply a perfect final cause or end for the creation of imperfect beings which could only be reached by the tuition and education of these into a perfect institution possessing perfect personality, and through immortal life.

THE SOURCES AND FACULTIES OF COGNITION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE POLISH OF E. TRENTOWSKI (FROM THE FIRST VOLUME OF HIS
"LOGIC") BY I. PODBIELSKI.

(Concluded.)

REMARK II.

We will devote here some space to the certitude of cognition and its immediateness.

Truth and knowledge are the essence of God in Heaven, and likewise of the universe; so, too, they are the essence of man, the highest being on the earth. They unite in God and stand forth as the living God's idea (*notio*). They unite also in man, and manifest themselves as cognition. Truth and knowledge in God is one, the same as truth and knowledge in man, because there can be neither two different truths nor two different knowledges.

God's living idea and man's cognition in potentia are identically the same, because cognition is both the divine breath within us and God's living idea (*notio*). Since, then, man manifests his own truth and knowledge in his cognition, he makes all truth and knowledge a temporal expression in the word. When he expresses his own idea (*notio*) in his cognition, he gives utterance to the living idea (*notio*) of God himself.

When a man has learned to know himself, he knows God, he knows all the creation, because truth, knowledge, and God's idea (*notio*) are everywhere the same. Cognition, therefore, this voice of truth, knowledge, and the living God's idea (*notio*), this voice of God himself in time, are immediately one. We, too, receive it from no external source; we draw it out with buckets, from no miraculous well; but developing what is innate within us—what lies in us and constitutes our being—we draw it out of ourselves, by our own activity. The true cognition, and such only is the free cognition, is not, if you wish for a precise expression, an acquired thing, but derived from ourselves.

Potentia—that is, our ability, God's breath in us—becomes actuality in the true cognition; our cognition in potentia becomes our cognition in actu. Cognition is essence, the very self hood unfolding itself into its own verbum, expressing its perception, its consciousness, and its selfhood. It is, if I may say so, the self-uttering immediateness of our God's breath (*notio*) within us. If our cognition in general is immediate, then much more so must be the three sources of our cognition—the senses, reason, and mind.

Some one will say here, perhaps: "I concede what you have said, if restricted to the case in which man recognizes himself. But if he make God, nature, or anything in general his object, does he recognize immediately? Certainly, the object here is not in him, but out of him, and through this his cognition becomes mediate. Without the aid of an object, man would not attain to its cognition." Even then we answer, man gets cognition immediately. Because truth, knowledge, and God's idea (*notio*), or God's word realized in an object, are not only different, but also identical with truth, knowledge, and God's idea (*notio*), or God's word in man. God has breathed into us His living idea (*notio*), and thus all truth and knowledge. Whatsoever is in God, in nature and spirit, in the past, the present, and the future world, is in us already, before our birth. All our art consists in drawing out of ourselves, or in acquiring this great living idea of God (*notio*). In acquiring the cognition of the object, which lies outside us, in acquiring the cognition of God, nature, of all things, we get the cognition of ourselves too. As the cognition of ourselves is the cognition of all existence, so, reciprocally, the cognition of all existence is the cognition of ourselves. Besides, who could enter

into immediate contact with the external object if the selfhood could not? To look around anything, would it stead us to borrow the eyes of an angel or a devil? Could we think through the head of another?

If, then, all cognition is immediate, so much more immediate are its sources.

Sense-perception lies dormant already in universal matter. It develops gradually, and comes into bloom finally in the animal, and more especially in the human senses. Sensuous contact with the thing of the external world is the same as contact with our own body. Sense is not merely our sense, but also the sense of the touched thing. Had it (potential sense) not been in this thing we could not touch it. If the sun had not been potentially in the pupil of our eye, we could not see the sun. If the sun were not outside us, it also would not be in us. In such cases the senses could not be the bond between the difference and indifference—between the empirical selfhood and the thing. This is God's law, and the holy dogma: What is within us, that is also outside us, and *vice versa*.

What we said of the senses is true of the comprehensive reason and of the comprehensive mind. Reason sleeps in the spirit of nature and awakes in man's spirit; mind dreams in every verbum of God and comes to the manifestation in the human selfhood. This philosophical difference in indifference, or the union of our being with the beings of the universe and with God himself, is the cause why our cognition is immediateness, and can be only that.

We are composed of body, spirit, and the soul, as St. Paul says also (I Thess., v, 23); or we are senses, reason, and mind. Body and spirit, senses and reason, are abstractions, but the soul or selfhood and the comprehensive mind are actuality. Therefore we obtain cognition, not by the body or the spirit, not by sense or reason, but always by our selfhood and comprehensive mind, and hence by our personality or immediately. The senses do not see, do not touch, but the selfhood, their substratum; likewise reason does not think, but our selfhood thinks. Moreover, we do not say our body, or our senses touch; nor our spirit or our reason thinks; but I touch, I think! And is it not the most manifest immediateness? We repeat, then, once more: if every cognition

is immediate, so much more its sources are immediate. For the reason that our selfhood acquires cognition neither by any miraculous rod, nor by any magic spectacles; nor by the divining wand discovering riches buried under the earth, but by itself or immediately; therefore it is entirely certain that it possesses immediate cognition; hence the infallibility or certitude of our cognition. The three sources of cognition are our inheritance; each of them has immediate certitude for itself, and rests upon the sure principal judgment, impossible to be denied. Hence, there are three immediate certitudes of cognition. To enter upon our subject more in detail:

The immediate certitude of sensuous cognition, upon which are based all experience and empiricism rich in useful sciences, is the immediate certitude of cognition first affirmed. The empirical selfhood takes a thing in its hand, and is sure of it immediately, and knows that this thing is, and that it holds it on the palm of its hand; and it knows that it is itself also, reality. By reality it means material, sensuous, tangible being.

It knows that itself is reality, for the reason that matter alone can touch matter, and enter into contact with it. The thing before me is, if I may say so, the southern pole, the empirical selfhood, the northern pole in the needle of real cognition, and the sense is the point of their difference in indifference; all three create the one whole, coming to its consciousness and to its verbum. The empirical selfhood says, therefore: *Sentio, ergo, res est, atque res sum!* Behold the first axiom, the empirical certitude, upon which experience builds up its palaces and temples. The empirical selfhood and the thing which it holds in its hand constitute the absolute unity in the moment of cognition, and the selfhood knows it immediately, or it is absolutely certain that it touches the thing. No assurance from any one else is needed to certify it of this perception; it knows this by itself. If any one dares deny this immediate certitude, it will resent the denial. It is mere sophistry to deny the objects touched with one's fingers, and to treat one's fingers as though they were dead sticks. Whosoever lives and is not a stick has senses with which to perceive objects and to know them immediately. My selfhood cannot touch and feel with the fingers of another. Its contact with external objects is immediate. Mediation is here an utter impos-

sibility. The infallible certitude of empirical cognition follows from its immediateness.

But not everything can be taken in the hand and touched. Therefore, the empirical selfhood has other senses. It tastes, smells, hears, and sees things. By these modes it gets cognition on various sides, and nearer, but always immediately. Certainly I convince myself, not with the tongue of another, but with my own, that pepper is hot, honey sweet, and vinegar sour. The eye is the farthest reaching sense, and perceives, in some sort, the infiniteness of nature. Where its power stops, it may be assisted with telescopes and microscopes. Yet these instruments have their limits, though nature is without limits. We come to this result, transferring ourselves, for instance, to another part of the world, and observing the stars; or, by the aid of the microscope, looking into small objects.

Therefore, the empirical selfhood expresses: *Sentio, ergo natura est, atque natura sum!*

It is the same certitude which we have known above, but applied to the generality of things. On this standpoint of cognition man is the sensuous or empirical selfhood, and comes to the physical feeling of himself and that of things.

The congruence of perception here makes its appearance. Man dissolves himself into sensation, he becomes sensation, and matter alone exists for him. Behold the source of Realism. The empirical selfhood, being a passive body, can have nothing else for its object than the corporeal. Whoever denies the immediateness of this cognition, whoever asserts that this immediateness is not the complete certitude, that we do not know whether we touch or not when we touch—in a word, who on this field plays the sceptic is weak and foolish. Diogenes cured one of these crazy men by beating him with a stick, and crying out, "Do you not feel?" And there is no better medicine for this disease. Whoever says that on touching a thing he does not feel this touching, must be convinced of his error by making him feel pain.

Every immediate certitude, therefore, and that which denotes sensuous cognition, cannot be proved. Every proof contains a certain mediation; and immediateness, by its very nature, does not know nor require mediation. Whoever wishes for mediation in immediateness does not himself know what he wishes for. To

prove to him who has shut his eyes that he holds in his hand a green, red, or white paper, let him open his eyes, and, if he be not blind, he will convince himself. The cognition of the senses has infallible certitude, and its axiom is the strongest pillar in the regions of cognition. For the general cognition rests upon it—*vox populi, consensus gentium*.

The immediate certitude of cognition which reason is possessed of is the second and negative, immediate cognition. The human spirit is the activity, internal movement or energy of our being; it is the invisible world, which enkindles itself in the body and moves it with its rays; it is spirit, thinking. The thinking selfhood knows by itself alone, and is immediately certain that it thinks; therefore it says: *Cogito, ergo mens sum, atque mens est*. It is the second axiom or certitude of cognition. The thinking selfhood is as certain that it thinks as the sensuous selfhood is certain that it touches. It is one and the same infallible certitude of the selfhood, but regarded at one time from the external, and at another from the internal side. *Mens* means not only thought, but also spirit and the spiritual selfhood, or Soul. The thinking selfhood, then, comes to the supernatural, speculative, self-feeling, or to the consciousness, and that in every moment of thinking. It dissolves itself here entirely into the rational; it is reason within itself and out of itself; an idea, a pure thought alone exists for it. Thought can have thought alone for its object, because it is impossible to touch the sensuous things with a thought. Spirit can enter into contact with spirit alone, and constitutes the speculative difference in indifference of cognition. The immediate certitude of rational cognition has been known to the world for centuries. The school of the Eleatics in ancient Greece built their system upon it. Descartes expressed it in the well-known sentence: *Cogito, ergo sum*. No German metaphysician, nor any thinking man, ever denied it. The sceptic who renounces thinking and doubts the same is found in contradiction with himself, and does not know what he says. To think and to deny thinking, is to be and not to be at the same time. It is an obvious logical contradiction. It is impossible, also, to prove to anybody the rational certitude of cognition, because it possesses immediateness. How to prove to him, who does not think and is an automaton, an artificial machine, that he

thinks? As you alone know that you think, so he alone can know that he thinks. Whoever does not know that he thinks, or that he has God's thought in himself, is not a human selfhood, but a mere thing. Metaphysics and speculation rest upon the rational certitude of thinking. It is quite as strong, however, as the empirical certitude. The particular science builds itself upon it: *vox uniuscujusque scientifici vatis*.

The immediate certitude of cognition being the inheritance of the philosophical mind is the third, and the last, or the limiting certitude of cognition. It is the proper and fullest and most important certitude of cognition, superior to the two which preceded. As the senses and reason unite in mind, so the sensuous and rational certitudes of cognition unite in that of the philosophical mind, forming the organic and living completeness or totality. The immediate sensuous certitude of cognition is affirmation; the rational one is negation; that of the comprehensive mind is limitation; all three form the one great infallible certitude which must be trusted; the full dogma placed in our selfhood or the soul; the holy book given us directly by God.

For the reason that in every third degree of truth the first two are contained as reality and ideality are contained in actuality, or as necessity and legality in liberty, as the useful and noble in the good, so also the immediate certitude of the comprehensive mind contains in itself both the sensuous and the rational certitude. Hence this full certitude is called the entire immediate certitude of cognition. The certitude of cognition of the comprehensive mind is the most immediate and the most infallible. For in the sensuous certitude of cognition our selfhood offers itself as sensuousness only; in the rational certitude of cognition it presents itself as rationalism alone, but in that of the comprehensive mind it is both together, or the total and full mind. It is manifest that in the last the entire Selfhood or soul acts, therefore its cognition stamps itself with the greatest immediateness and infallibility.

The full selfhood or soul, having developed its mind adequately, arrives at its own self-feeling, self-sense, or selfhood, and knows immediately that it is divine. Then it says: *Sum numen, ergo Deus est*. It is the third axiom or certitude of cognition, being the most precious gift, that we have obtained from heaven. Be-

cause in the divine all qualities are implicitly contained, and may be immediately deduced from it, the just mentioned axiom of cognition of the comprehensive mind leads to the secondary ones : namely, *sum libertas, ergo est libertas ; sum eternus, ergo est vita eterna ; sum verum, pulchrum et honestum, est igitur verum, pulchrum et honestum ; est in me conscientia, est igitur virtus.*

The full selfhood or soul is in its basis a deity, and stands with God in absolute unity, and is able to enter into close communion with him ; it can then say of itself as God himself : *Sum qui sum.* And this *sum qui sum*, creative and created, opens and closes each of the philosophical investigations. The axiom, or certitude of the comprehensive mind, attaining cognition, is as immediate and infallible as the sensuous and rational certitude, but the former is richer and fuller than both these latter. That I am I know immediately and certainly, as much as I know that I touch something, and that I think. I know immediately and certainly that I have conscience, that I love truth, beauty, virtue ; that I am free and immortal. I know, then, equally, immediately, and certainly, that there are conscience, truth, beauty, virtue, liberty, and immortality. These immediate truths cannot be proved to anybody who does not find them in his own breast. Whoever remains here a sceptic is not a man, but a brute. I know immediately that I am a spark of God, a deity, and hence that God exists. The existence of God cannot be proved to him who has expelled God from his soul or selfhood. Whoever denies God denies also himself, and says in effect : “I am a skull without brain, and a breast without a heart. I am nought, the greatest cipher, the cipher of ciphers. Evil is the negation of good.” Therefore, whoever loses God has torn asunder his own mind, and has sunk either into sensuousness or rationalism. Hence it follows that no philosopher, but only an empiric or a metaphysician, can be an atheist. We know that the comprehensive mind is twofold—the temporal and the eternal. In both cases it says : *Sum numen !* The temporal mind, however, develops the divine nature of man in the age in which we live, and places some genius on a throne, or in earthly power, in office, in splendor. It is, for instance, the mind of Hildebrand, of Voltaire, Talleyrand, Napoleon, etc.

But the eternal mind calls all that Mammon, and, leading us

before the throne of the goddess of wisdom, anoints us with the balsam of philosophy, and makes us philosophers. In philosophy lies the highest form of sacrifice and the most honorable form of priesthood. It is necessary at first to be born a philosopher, and afterward to be made the priest of philosophy by one's own efforts.

This doctrine of immediateness of cognition, and its axioms or certitudes, will certainly astonish many a thinker, especially those who know German speculation. For German speculation teaches here entirely the contrary, and Hegel's system has proclaimed aloud hitherto as follows: "The cognition having the most mediation is the most perfect, the most certain." What brought Hegel and German philosophy to such a conviction? It is the subjectivity falsely seized, and the lack of insight into the nature of the true selfhood. We know that the selfhood acquiring cognition is what the Germans conceive as subject, and the thing that is the aim of cognition is the German object, and the internal speculative selfhood or thinking, pure thought alone is the total German selfhood or Soul. This being the case, it was natural that the thing that is the aim of cognition must find its immediateness in thinking, or the object must be mediated in the subject till the cognition takes place; therefore every cognition needs mediation.

We have a different theory of this relation between the selfhood acquiring cognition and the thing that is to be known, hence we have another, and, as we hope, better conviction.

Our selfhood and its object constitute the difference in indifference, or unity $A=A$. The faculty of cognition is here the connecting link belonging equally to both sides and leading to the immediate contact with each other. Hegel is the most obstinate enemy of immediateness in cognition, and it is for this reason that he did not understand it thoroughly. He says: "If immediate knowledge is to be the criterion of truth, it will follow that it is necessary to defend every superstition and idolatry for truth, also to recognize as holy the most immoral and foolish substance of will, for instance the caprice that worships a cow or a monkey. Brahma and the Lama are deities to the Hindoo or Buddhist, not by knowledge, as the consequence of mediation—that is, not by the understanding or reason—but merely because he believes it immediately." This is surprising. Do we not understand, and

do we not reason by our head only—that is, immediately? Does not every belief depend upon a mediation and even a miraculous one? What, then, Hegel says against the immediateness of cognition can avail only against his mediateness.

But the mediate cognition is an equally important truth, often even more important than the immediate one. Such is the mediate cognition that we obtain through the intermediation of other men or other books. Our entire learning in schools, in universities, and in after-life—the entire wisdom to which we come by a diligent reading—all that is the sweet fruit of mediate cognition. In truth, immediate cognition created our sciences, and even to-day by immediate cognition we acquire new observations and progress, and we learn new philosophical systems, and all that is original and carries us forward. But, in order to learn what men know already, what genius has discovered and described, to master the substance of our libraries, mediate cognition is absolutely necessary to us. To-day sciences stand in great repute and diffuse themselves everywhere. How can one become a physician, a lawyer, a clergyman, a chemist, a politician, and even a philosopher, without studying these for these objects, in universities, or without mediate cognition?

A young man, before entering cultivated society, must study much and long, in order that he may learn what is required of one of its members. The more he studies the more positively he will be able to stand independently. To day, then, mediate cognition goes before immediate, and is its chief foundation. Not in vain does religion preach to us of the God-man and his absolute immediateness! We ought, however, to understand this thing quite otherwise than in the monkish spirit.

Nevertheless, it is the destiny of every mediate cognition to serve in our youth for the nourishment of spirit, to enlighten us, to make us spontaneous, and to carry us on to the immediate cognition! The mediate cognition is only the mother's breast, or education in the school to prepare us for the immediate one. We acquire the former as passive beings, and we derive the latter from ourselves, as God drew from himself the whole world, and as every divine being is obliged to do. The first cognition makes us learned, the second makes us inventive, both together make us cultivated and accomplished men. Although mediate cognition has an im-

mense value, although it is true that without it it is impossible to-day for the greatest man—even for a person of genius—to acquit himself in science worthily of himself and of his century yet without mediate cognition, one can be only a semi-rude and ridiculous “self-made” man, a shallow “natural talent.” Yet mediate knowing is not the end of our learning, but only the means to the end.

The learned man who has nothing but learning remains always in the state of spiritual childhood. His spontaneous selfhood has never been awakened, and, having been fed continually upon mediation, has been unable to assimilate it and convert it into immediate cognition. Not mediate, but immediate cognition is the golden fleece after which the Argonauts of learning have made their voyages for centuries! Mediate cognition makes us students, followers, parrots of the words of others, school-boys; immediate cognition makes us masters, idols of the world, worthy brethren of Socrates, Plato, Leibnitz, Hegel, and even of the Saviour himself! He only can be a son of God, and a God-man, who has come to immediate cognition, and who, in his character, principles, and actions, represents God himself. Not mediate, but immediate cognition is holy, is the manifestation of God’s word. The mediate gives us wisdom, revealed by men, and the immediate cognition gives the wisdom which God himself breathed into our being; the former is human wisdom, the latter is God’s wisdom. The immediate cognition is the criterion of the mediate one. “If I investigate myself only and know truth immediately, I may be convinced how much is right in this or that philosophy, in this or that religion; in a word, in any given theory, and, besides, how much it is worthy of my esteem. The mediate cognition is the earth upon which I am to build the temple for the immediate one; it is the food of my spirit, it is the medium, but not the end of my exertions.” So reasons every selfhood which is possessed of its own self-feeling and sense, and which is conscious of its divine nature. It is not here our purpose to underrate the mediate cognition, the high value and necessity of which we recognize; we wish only to represent its subordination, and also its relation, to the immediate cognition. The axiom or certitude of cognition of the comprehensive mind relies upon the word *I am*. From this word the logical Analysis begins, and ends at the same *I am*.

I am that I am = *Sum qui sum!*